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Abstract. This paper studies four trading algorithms of a professional trader at a multi-
lateral trading facility, either internalizing or regular, observing a realistic two-sided limit
order book whose dynamics are driven by the order book events. We shall show that the
price switching algorithms provide lower and upper bounds of the mixed trading algorithms.
The optimal price switching strategy exists and is expressed in terms of the value function.
A parallelizable algorithm to numerically compute the value function and optimal price
switching strategy for the discretized state process is provided.
Keywords and Phrases: Limit order book, algorithmic trading, stochastic impulse and opti-
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Market microstructure is an interdisciplinary field involving economics, finance, probability
and optimization, statistics, and even psychology, which studies the order-driven price for-
mulation processes in markets like those of stocks, futures and foreign exchanges. Due to the
complexity of the phenomena, the research works on market microstructure usually focus on
individual aspects of the problem. Interesting questions studied so far include econometrics
of the order books and of the market maker’s inventory levels, optimal market making, a
buyer or seller’s optimal order execution, and limiting behaviors of the queuing system of
limit orders and bid and ask prices.
The study of market microstructure dates back to at least four decades ago, and persists
up till present time. It is hard to enumerate all the literature on this field. The books
O’Hara (1997) and Hasbrouck (2007) provide an overview of quantitative analysis of market
microstructure. One significant development in recent years is the prevalence of electronic
trading platforms as an alternative to markets where prices are determined via a market
maker’s auction and the traders’ bidding; the other is the popularity of applying stochastic
control to solving optimal execution and optimal market making problems. Readers are wel-
come to Lehalle and Laruelle (2013) for latest updates in the field of market microstructure
and algorithmic trading.
Stochastic control provides the theory and methodologies to find actions that optimize an
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objective, while the actions can influence the evolution of some random processes to which
the objective is associated. It naturally facilitates the study of financial markets where par-
ticipants, the assembly of whose activities contribute to the price evolution, seek to maximize
profits and minimize losses. The application of stochastic control to optimizing activities in
an order book traces back to early works like Ho and Stoll (1981).
There have been many frameworks to study trading and order execution in limit order
books. Among them are the equilibrium models surveyed in Parlour and Seppi (2008), the
model with stochastic bid and ask prices and deterministic order book shape as in Alfonsi,
Schied and coauthors (2009, 2010, 2012) and in Predoiu, Shaikhet and Shreve (2011), the
model with stochastic mid price and deterministic or stochastic spread as in Avellaneda and
Stoikov (2008) and Guilbaud and Pham (2013), the Almgren-Chriss model used by many in
the industry, as in Almgren (2003), Almgren and Chriss (2000), Bouchard, Dang and Lehalle
(2011) and Gatheral and Schied (2011), and maximizing the utility by choosing an optimal
posting distance that determines the intensity of the execution process as in Gue´ant, Lehalle
and Fernandez-Tapia (2012a, 2012b) and Laruelle, Lehalle and Page`s (2011).
1.2 This paper
An optimal trading scheme is obviously a function of the trading constraints of the trading
agent, translated into its reward function. To express the adequate trading function, a spe-
cific market model is often needed. Up to now, two main agent types have been investigated
- directional traders and market makers.
* Directional traders: such agents already took the decision to buy or sell and the amount
of shares to buy or sell before the trading phase. Typically institutional investors like pension
funds are of this kind. The control of associated trading schemes is usually the local trading
rate, and more rarely a price (Gue´ant, Lehalle and Fernandez-Tapia, 2012a, 2012b). The
associated market models include classical price diffusion and a market impact component.
* Market makers: on the opposite, such agents make decisions in real time, 100% based
on the state of the order books; they are simultaneously buyers and sellers, mostly providing
liquidity to other traders. The part of high frequency traders often seen as the “new middle-
men” are of this kind (Baron, Brogaard and Kirilenko, 2012; Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2011;
Menkveld, 2013). Their control is the buying and selling prices, at which they send limit
orders around the best bid and best ask immediate prices. The associated market models
usually embed trading flows abstracted by a point process, without any market impact com-
ponent, since the nature of the market impact of limit orders has not been explored by now.
This paper models a third kind of agents: the risk taking intermediaries. The “system-
atic internalizers” defined by the European regulation are of this kind. Any investment
bank having the capabilities
(1) to internalize some of its flow against a price improvement for his external or internal
clients;
(2) to get rid of its potential inventory imbalance, like in a dark pool, in a dedicated
trading pool at the instantaneous mid price.
The controls will be the number of shares bought and sold up-to-date at every price level in
the displayed order book and in the dedicated trading pool. Hence the modeled order book
dynamics will have to embed full order book depth.
Our study will be presented as follows. Section 2 introduces the event-driven order book
dynamics. Sections 3 and 4 formulate the stochastic control problems faced by the optimal
trader and prove their well-posedness. Section 5 compares the best expected profits of a
regular trader and a systemic internalizer, either can use mixed strategies or price switching
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strategies. Section 6 solves the optimal price switching problem by providing a representa-
tion of the optimal strategy, a discrete-time numerical algorithm and implementation in a
Binomial model. Finally, we suggest a way to calculate a “fair” internalization premium.
The contribution of this study is multi-fold.
(1) The agent that conducts the trading activities is a risk taking intermediary. Such
agents make up a significant proportion of the market participants in terms of the capital
amount, but there has not yet been much research into their optimal trading strategies.
(2) One recent development in market microstructure is the event-driven limit order book
models, by Rama Cont and co-authors and by Hasbrouck and Saar (2010). Especially when
the trader reacts at a super speed (called “high frequency trading”), this kind of models
captures the real observations, because the Central Limit Theorem that proves a diffusion-
like stock price no longer applies. This paper is the first one that derives optimal trading
strategies in a variation of their cutting-edge models.
(3) The optimal trading strategy will balance between the speed and cost of trading,
by active orders in the book and passive orders at the mid price in the dark pool. There is
another kind of strategies more passive than hidden orders, which is orders queuing up at
the best available prices. Interested readers are invited to Huang, Lehalle and Rosenbaum
(2013) for an empirical analysis and Lachapelle, Lasry, Lehalle and Lions (2013) for a mean
field game modeling of an agent’s optimal queuing.
(4) The optimal price switching problem we shall solve belongs to the classical type of
impulse control and optimal control, but its state process is non-standard, more complicated
than a textbook SDE driven by Brownian motions and Poisson random measures.
(5) A parallelizable algorithm is provided for numerically computing the value func-
tion and the optimal price switching strategy for a discretized state process. The compu-
tational complexity of a stochastic control problem using backward induction should have
been well known on a serial computer, while to the author’s best knowledge this paper is
the first one to document the complexity on a parallel computer.
(6) The results in this paper give insights into trading activities within the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive framework, by different types of traders using different
types of trading strategies.
2 The two-sided order book dynamics
As usual in optimal trading (Alfonsi and Schied, 2010, 2012; Bertsimas and Lo, 1998;
Bouchard, Dang and Lehalle, 2011; Gue´ant, Lehalle and Fernandez-Tapia, 2012a, 2012b),
the market dynamics are modeled on their own and do not specifically react to the optimal
trader’s actions. We will not model any explicit market impact, following usual frameworks
allowing the optimal trader to post limit orders (Avellaneda and Stoikov, 2008) as opposite
to framework for optimal trading with aggressive orders (Obizhaeva and Wang, 2013) or at
a larger time scale than the orderbook one (Almgren and Chriss, 2000). Our optimal trader
is a “systematic internalizer” in the MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive)
sense: as an intermediary or a dedicated market maker, he can capture market order flow
provided that he pays a premium (i.e. he improves the price) of the liquidity taker. Our
optimal trader will such implement a trading scheme close to a market making one: he will
capture aggressive flows at the bid and ask, thus earn the bid-ask spread minus twice the
premium he provides. As usual, he will face a market risk increasing with his inventory
(Ho and Stoll, 2008). In our specific case, the optimal trader will operate a Dark Pool
(Cebiroglu, Hautsch and Horst, 2013) or a similar trading platform, where he will try to
unwind its inventory at the mid-price. High frequency market makers, like Knight Capital
Group, operate such dark pools (“knight link” in this specific case).
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2.1 Illustration of the order book
This subsection and the next will introduce the order book dynamics formed by the aggre-
gate activities of all the market participants, when the optimal trader does not act.
In preparation, let us present a few terminologies that appear frequently in discussions
about a limit order book. For every stock in the market, there are several types of orders,
the most commonly used types being the limit order and the market order. A market buy
(sell) order only specifies the number of shares and is executed immediately at the lowest ask
(highest bid) price available in the market. A limit buy (sell) order specifies the number of
shares and the highest (lowest) price at which the trader is willing to buy (sell). According
to the rules of best price first and FIFO (short for “first in first out”) at the same price level,
limit orders are executed when there are matching sell (buy) orders at their specified prices.
The records of all limit orders waiting to be executed are maintained. The set of the records
is called a limit order book. A limit order book is a “reservoir” of limit orders. It records
the number of shares, the price and the time of order arrival or cancelation for every limit
order. Once a limit order is submitted, if it is not executed immediately, then this order is
“stored” in the limit order book until being “released” and disappearing from the book for
one of the three reasons – execution, cancelation, or expiration. The total of limit orders
at each price level is called one limit. The lowest ask price (highest bid price) in the book
is called the ask price (bid price) for short. The difference between the ask price and the
bid price is called the spread. The distance between two adjacent price levels at which limit
orders can be submitted is called the tick size.
Fig. 2.1 illustrates a snapshot of a typical limit order book at some time t. The verti-
cal axis represents the different price levels in the book, where P a(t) is the current ask
price, P b(t) is the current bid price and δ is the tick size. The horizontal axis represents the
volume, in other words the number of shares, of limit orders at each price level. The sell side
of the book is shown in gray and the buy side in dark. For example, the volume of limit sell
orders at the ask price is denoted as Qa(t), which equals the length of the gray horizontal
line at the price level P a(t); the volume of limit buy orders at the price level P b(t) − 2δ
is denoted as Qb2(t), which equals the length of the dark horizontal line at that level. The
spread is defined as P a(t)− P b(t). Without loss of generality, the tick size is set as δ = 1.
All the limit sell (buy) orders at and higher (lower) than the best ask (bid) price are dis-
played to the market participants. The volumes of limit orders beyond the best ask and
best bid prices are constants. In the notations illustrated in Fig. 2.1, this means that
Qa1(t) = Q
a
2(t) = · · · = ∆
a and Qb1(t) = Q
b
2(t) = · · · = ∆
b, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where ∆a
and ∆b are two positive constants. The number Qa of limit sell orders at the ask price and
the number Qb of limit buy orders at the bid price are two stochastic processes. When the
spread P a − P b is more than one tick, limit sell orders can arrive one tick below the ask
price P a, and limit buy orders can arrive one tick above the bid price P b. The best ask (bid)
price remains constant, until either all the sell (buy) orders at the current price get depleted
or new limit sell (buy) orders arrive at the price one tick lower (higher). If the number of all
the sell (buy) orders at the best ask (bid) price reaches zero, then the best ask (bid) price
increases (decreases) by one tick, i.e.
P a(t) = P a(t−) + 1 or P b(t) = P b(t−)− 1,
and the volume at the new ask (bid) price is given by
Qa(t) = ∆a or Qb(t) = ∆b. (2.1)
If limit sell (buy) orders arrive at time t at one tick below the ask price P a(t−) (above the
bid price P b(t−)), the ask (bid) price decreases (increases) by one tick, i.e.
P a(t) = P a(t−)− 1 or P b(t) = P b(t−) + 1,
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and each arrival contains ∆a (∆b) shares, i.e. the expression (2.1) holds; the number of limit
sell (buy) orders at the old ask price P a(t−) (the old bid price P b(t−)) remains Qa(t−)
(Qb(t−)) at time t and resets to ∆a (∆b) at time t+. We could make Qa1(t), Q
a
2(t), · · ·
and Qb1(t), Q
b
2(t), · · · Markov processes with independent increments. The assumption that
they are constants will significantly reduce the dimensionality of the control problem while
making decisions based on the major driving forces of the order book dynamics.
Besides all the displayed orders that form the limit order book in Fig. 2.1, there is a
“dark pool” mechanism within the spread. Simultaneously, the trader has the opportunity
to place one mid-price pegged order in the spread: these orders are posted at the price(
P a(t) + P b(t)
)
/2 at any time t. He has to choose if it is a buy order or sell order, since he
cannot simultaneously post a buy and a sell order at the same price. Other market partic-
ipants sending orders of the opposite side and having access to the dark pool will consume
∆a (∆b) shares of his order.
2.2 Mathematical formulation of the order book dynamics
This subsection will formulate rigorously the dynamics of the limit order book over a deter-
ministic finite time horizon [0, T ].
Any change to the limit order book, either in the bid and ask prices, or in the available
shares at each price level, is caused by one of the four types of events – limit order arrival,
limit order cancelation or expiration, limit order execution, and market order arrival and
immediate execution. The two sources of movements are the changes in the volumes at the
current best prices and the arrivals within the spread, which in turn result in all the changes
in the prices. The randomness in the order book dynamics is modeled by the following
ingredients.
(1) Probability space (Ω,F,P).
(2) Positive constants σa and σb.
(3) Independent standard Brownian motions σaW a and σbW b, representing the evolution
of Qa and Qb when there is no price change.
(4) Known measurable functions θa, θb, λa and λb : N → [0,∞), satisfying θa(1) =
θb(1) = 0.
(5) Inhomogeneous Poisson processes Na and N b, with intensities θa(P a(t−)− P b(t−))
and θb
(
P a(t−)− P b(t−)
)
at time t. When the spread is larger than one tick, limit sell and
buy orders are posted according to Na and N b at a small price improvement - the best bid
plus one tick for a buy order and the best ask minus one tick for a sell order.
(6) Inhomogeneous Poisson processes Ha and Hb, with intensities λa
(
P a(t−)− P b(t−)
)
and λb
(
P a(t−)− P b(t−)
)
at time t. The trader’s buy and sell orders posted in the dark
pool are filled at the mid price according to the liquidity events Ha and Hb.
(7) Conditioning on the spread, the next arrival times of Na, N b, Ha and Hb are inde-
pendent of each other and independent of the future increment of W a and W b.
(8) The filtration F = {Ft}0≤t≤T , generated by the processes W
a, W b, Na, N b, Ha
and Hb.
To prove the well-posedness of Problem 4.1 and thus Problem 3.1, the intensities of the
order arrival processes within the spread are assumed uniformly bounded.
Assumption 2.1 The intensity functions θa, θb, λa and λb of the inhomogeneous Poisson
processes Na, N b, Ha and Hb satisfy
θi∗ := sup
p∈R
{
θi(p)
}
<∞ and λi∗ := sup
p∈R
{
λi(p)
}
<∞, i = a, b. (2.2)
The event-driven limit order book model and the study for an optimal trading algorithm
based on it are proposed in Section 4.2 by Lehalle (2013). Consistent with existing works,
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the dynamics indeed capture the main features of a limit order book. Empirical studies
(Cont, Stoikov and Talreja, 2010, and Hasbrouck and Saar, 2010) observe that inhomoge-
neous Poisson processes are proper to model the order arrivals and cancelations at different
prices, and that the orders in the neighborhoods closest to the bid and ask prices being
the most influential to the stock price dynamics. An explanation for the latter observation
is that the limit orders whose execution prices are far away from the bid and ask prices
are more likely to be placed by speculators to profit from sudden dramatic price changes.
Hence, if tracking only the volumes at the bid and ask prices, it makes a reasonable ap-
proximation to the real limit order books. The model we use is inspired by Rama Cont and
co-authors. Cont, Kukanov and Stoikov (2014) proposed an order flow imbalance model to
describe the stylized features of an order book, where the number of shares at each price
level beyond the best prices is constant and limit order arrivals and cancelations occur only
at the best bid and ask prices. Further, Cont and de Larrard (2011, 2013) have shown that
a two-dimensional Brownian motion is a reasonable model for the dynamics of the volumes
at first limits, when the bid-ask spread does not vary too much.
The number of times over [0, t] that all the orders at the current ask and bid prices are
depleted is
Li(t) =
∑
0≤s≤t
1{Qi(s−)≤0}, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , i = a, b. (2.3)
At every time the volume at the ask (bid) price is depleted, meaning that Li(t)−Li(t−) = 1,
the ∆a (respectively ∆b) shares at the higher (lower) price level are exposed and the ask
(bid) price increases (decreases) by one tick. At every arrival of limit sell (buy) orders within
the spread, meaning that N i(t)−N i(t−) = 1, the new limit at the lower (higher) price level
contains ∆a (respectively ∆b) shares and the ask (bid) price decreases (increases) by one
tick. At any other time, the volumes move according to the Brownian motions and the
prices remain constants.
Following the above reasoning, the dynamics of the order book can be described by the
four-dimensional process (Qa, Qb, P a, P b). The volumes Qa and Qb move according to
Qi(t) = Qi0 + σ
iW i(t) +
∫ t
0
(∆i −Qi(t−)) d (Li +N i)(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , i = a, b. (2.4)
The prices move according to
P a(t) = P a(0) + La(t)−Na(t), and P b(t) = P b(0)− Lb(t) +N b(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (2.5)
The process (Qa, Qb, P a, P b) defined in (2.2) and (2.2) is Markovian.
Fig. 2.2 and Fig. 2.3 plot a simulated path of the two-sided order book dynamics (2.2)
and (2.2). Fig. 2.2 shows the ask (top gray line) and bid (bottom dark line) prices. Each
time of price change due to order depletion is assigned a 10% probability that it is an
execution (indicated by circles) and a 90% probability that it is a cancelation. Fig. 2.3
shows the volumes at the ask (value of the top gray line) and bid (absolute value of the
bottom dark line) prices respectively in the positive and negative axis. The parameters are
T = 600, P a(0) = 20, P b(0) = 15, Qa(0) = Qb(0) = ∆a = ∆b = 5, σa = σb = 10 and
θa(P a(t)− P b(t)) = θb(P a(t)− P b(t)) = 0.5(P a(t)− P b(t)).
2.3 Execution in the dark pool
This subsection will formulate rigorously the optimal trader’s activities inside the dark pool.
The trader’s decision on whether to accept an upcoming liquidity event in the dark pool is
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indicated by the set of admissible hidden order strategies defined below. Be it an internal-
izing trader or a regular trader, the admissible set of hidden order strategies is the same.
Definition 2.1 (hidden order strategy) The trader’s decisions on whether to accept the hid-
den orders are indicated by the F -adapted, right-continuous, {0, 1}-valued processes ha and
hb : [0, T ]× Ω→ {0, 1}. The process ha equals zero on the set{
(t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω|P b(t) ≥ p¯a
}
, (2.6)
and the process hb equals zero on the set{
(t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω|P a(t) ≤ pb
}
. (2.7)
At any time t ∈ [0, T ], ha(t) and hb(t) cannot both equal to one. The collection of all such
processes h = (ha, hb) are denoted as H . The subset of H restricted on [t1, t2] × Ω is
denoted as Ht1,t2 , and Ht,T is denoted as Ht for short.
In Definition 2.1, the right-continuity of ha and hb guarantees that, for each scenario ω ∈ Ω,
the hidden orders are revised finitely many times over the time horizon [0, T ]. The value
ha(t) = 1 (hb(t) = 1) means that the trader places a hidden limit buy (sell) order of ∆a (∆b)
shares with the execution the price
(
P a(t) + P b(t)
)
/2 (respectively
(
P a(t) + P b(t)
)
/2); the
value ha(t) = 0 (hb(t) = 0) means that he does not place the hidden order. The processes
ha and hb being zero on the sets in (2.1) and (2.1) requires that the trader’s hidden orders
would only buy below the price p¯a and sell above the price pb.
Suppose an liquidity sell (buy) event occurs at time t, meaning that Ha(t) −Ha(t−) = 1
(respectively Ha(t)−Ha(t−) = 1). If the trader placed a hidden limit buy (sell) order right
before time t with the execution price
(
P a(t) + P b(t)
)
/2 (respectively
(
P a(t) + P b(t)
)
/2),
then he successfully buys ∆a shares (sells ∆b shares) at time t and pays (receives) a cash
amount of ∆a
(
P a(t) + P b(t)
)
/2 (respectively ∆b
(
P a(t) + P b(t)
)
/2). Using a generic hid-
den order strategy h = (ha, hb) ∈ H , the trader’s stock inventory and cash amount from
trading hidden orders are
Ih(t) =∆a
∫ t
0
ha(s−)dHa(s)−∆b
∫ t
0
hb(s−)dHb(s);
Ch(t) =−∆a
∫ t
0
ha(s−)
((
P a(t) + P b(t)
)
/2
)
dHa(s)
+ ∆b
∫ t
0
hb(s−)
((
P a(t) + P b(t)
)
/2
)
dHb(s), 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
(2.8)
3 The optimal trading problem
Suppose the collective activities of the market participants form the order book dynamics
are described in the previous section. The optimal trader will trade on top of this aggre-
gated dynamics. He places a combination of active and hidden orders. The active orders will
immediately “internalize” incoming market orders. His hidden orders in the dark pool may
or may not be executed at the next moment, but once they are executed the trader receives
a price half the spread lower or higher than the current ask or bid price. The flexibility to
choose between active and hidden orders enables finding an optimal balance between taking
the decision to internalize orders providing them a price improvement, and the naturally
associated adverse selection he is exposed to via his inventory.
Depending on his informational advantage, the trader is identified as either regular or inter-
nalizing. Most traders in today’s markets, including all the traders in Europe, are regular.
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They observe and only observe the current records in the order book. An internalizing trader
has the priority of observing incoming orders and acting upon them immediately before the
orders are displayed to other market participants. It offers an additional choice to buy or
sell at a slightly inferior price so that there is no impact on the current best price.
3.1 Actively filling displayed orders
An active trading strategy places orders that will be fully and immediately executed at the
best prices available, minus a “price improvement” offered to his counterpart if necessary.
The total shares that the trader has bought and sold up till time t by actively internal-
izing the market orders consist of those filled at the best available price, denoted by the
increasing processes {Za(t)}0≤t≤T and {Z
b(t)}0≤t≤T , and of those filled at the old prices
plus/minus a price improvement ǫ > 0 when new limit orders arrive within the spread, de-
noted by the processes {βa(t)}0≤t≤T and {β
b(t)}0≤t≤T as the proportion of shares filled at
the old price with respect to the total number of existing shares at the old price right before
the transaction. The active trading strategy Z = (Za, Zb, βa, βb) is called
– continuously re-balanced, if Za and Zb are continuous in the time t;
– discretely re-balanced, if Za and Zb are pure jump processes;
– mixed, if Za and Zb are mixtures of the above two.
This subsection formulates mixed active trading strategies (“mixed trading strategies” for
short) respectively for an internalizing trader and a regular trader.
Definition 3.1 (mixed trading strategy)
(1) The set of admissible mixed trading strategies Z int of an internalizing trader is the
collection of all trading strategies Z = (Za, Zb, βa, βb) satisfying the following two criteria.
(1.1) The F -adapted ca`dla`g processes {Za(t)}0≤t≤T and {Z
b(t)}0≤t≤T are non-negative
and non-decreasing over the time interval [0, T ]. The F -adapted processes {βa(t)}0≤t≤T
and {βb(t)}0≤t≤T take values within the interval [0, 1].
(1.2) For two given positive integers pb < p¯a, the process Za is flat on
{(t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω|P a(t) ≥ p¯a},
and Zb is flat on
{(t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω|P b(t) ≤ pb};
the process βa is non-zero only on
{(t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω|P a(t) < p¯a, Na(t)−Na(t−) = 1 and Za(t)− Za(t−) < ∆a},
and the process βb is non-zero only on
{(t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω|P b(t) > pb, N b(t)−N b(t−) = 1 and Zb(t)− Zb(t−) < ∆b}.
(2) The set of admissible mixed trading strategies Z reg of a regular trader is defined as
Z
reg :=
{
Z = (Za, Zb, βa, βb) ∈ Z int
∣∣βa(t) ≡ βb(t) ≡ 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ]} .
Criterion (1.1) in Definition 3.1 defines an internalizing trader’s mixed trading strategy.
The bounded prices in Criterion (1.2) requires that the trader only buy below the price
p¯a and sell above the price pb. In practice, when the prices goes outside of their normal
range, no trading reflects a psyche of not to take up risk or push the prices further towards
the extreme; technically, it will be used to prove the well-posedness of Problem 4.1, or in
other words that the value function is finite. The other requirement about βa and βb in
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Criterion (1.2) means that it is only necessary to consider filling a fractional column at the
old price when new limit orders arrive within the spread. Allowing for optimizing over this
fraction enables a path-wise replication of the effect of every mixed trading strategy by a
price switching strategy, as will be shown in section 5. A regular trader’s mixed trading
strategy defined in Criterion (2) is the same as that of an internalizing trader, except that
at the time of order arrival within the spread, the regular trader can no longer fill the orders
at the old price, which is formulated as βa ≡ βb ≡ 0.
The rest of the current subsection will write, in the case of an internalizing trader, the or-
der book dynamics and the trader’s stock inventory and cash amount in compact formulae.
They can be verified by enumerating all the situations that could trigger a change in the bid
or ask price. To adjust to the case of a regular trader is only a matter of setting βa ≡ βb ≡ 0.
The order book dynamics from equations (2.2), (2.2) and (2.2), is now controlled by the
trader using an admissible mixed trading strategy Z. The number of times over [0, t] that
all the orders at the current ask and bid prices are depleted can be expressed as
Li(t) =
∑
0≤s≤t
1{Qi(s−)−(Zi(s)−Zi(s−))≤0}, i = a, b.
For i = a, b, the changes
µa(t) = P a(t)− P a(t−) and µb(t) = −
(
P b(t)− P b(t−)
)
in the controlled ask and bid price processes at time t can be computed by
µi(t) =


−1, if N i(t)−N i(t−) = 1 and Zi(t)− Zi(t−) < ∆i;
0, if N i(t)−N i(t−) = 1 and ∆i ≤ Zi(t)− Zi(t−) < Qi(t−) + ∆i,
or if t = T and Zi(T )− Zi(T−) < Qi(T−);⌊(
Zi(t)− Zi(t−)−Qi(t−)
)
/∆i
⌋
+ 1− (N i(t)−N i(t−)), else.
The controlled volumes Qa and Qb at the ask and bid prices move according to
Qi(t) =Qi0 + σ
iW i(t)− Zi(t) + ∆i
∫ t
0
(µi(s))+dLi(s)
+
∫ t
0
1{µi(s)≤0}
(
∆i − (µi(s))−Qi(s−)
)
dN i(s), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , i = a, b.
The controlled ask and bid prices P a and P b move according to
P a(t) =P a(0) +
∫ t
0
(µa(s))+dLa(s)−
∫ t
0
(µa(s))−dNa(s);
P b(t) =P b(0)−
∫ t
0
(µb(s))+dLb(s) +
∫ t
0
(µb(s))−dN b(s), 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
(3.1)
At every time t ∈ [0, T ], a mixed trading strategy Z gives the trader an inventory of stock
shares
IZ(t) = Za(t)− Zb(t) +
∫ t
0
βa(s)Qa(s−)dNa(s)−
∫ t
0
βb(s)Qb(s−)dN b(s). (3.2)
Let ǫ be the premium per share that the trader pays his counterpart, for internalizing limit
orders at the old price upon the arrival of incoming orders at the new better price. Using
the mixed trading strategy Z, the total cash amount that the trader pays the seller (receives
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from the buyer) of the stock denoted as CZa (respectively C
Z
b ) can be calculated by
CZa (t) =
∫ t
0
P a(s−)dZa(s) +
∫ t
0
βa(s)Qa(s−) (P a(s−) + ǫ) dNa(s)
+
∫ t
0
(
1
2
∆ad(P a(s))2 +
(
1
2
∆a −Qa(s)
)
dP a(s)−∆adNa(s)
)
,
(3.3)
and
CZb (t) =
∫ t
0
P b(s−)dZb(s) +
∫ t
0
βb(s)Qb(s−)
(
P b(s−)− ǫ
)
dN b(s)
−
∫ t
0
(
1
2
∆bd(P b(s))2 +
(
1
2
∆b −Qb(s)
)
dP b(s)−∆bdN b(s)
)
.
(3.4)
In the equation (3.1), the two integrals count the total number of shares bought and sold at
the old prices when limit orders arrive within the spread. In each of the equations (3.1) and
(3.1), the first integral on the right hand side of the identity is the amount of cash paid and
received if all the orders placed at the best available prices were executed at the bid and ask
prices observed right before each transaction, as they are when the prices do not change and
there is no arrival within the spread. The second integral counts the cash amount paid and
received from filling the limit orders at the old prices when new limit orders arrive within
the spread. The third integral collects the additional cost paid for trading deeper into the
book and the savings from filling the arriving limit orders within the spread.
The trader’s cumulative cash amount on his account at time t from the mixed trading
strategy Z is
CZ(t) = −CZa (t) + C
Z
b (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.5)
3.2 The goal of trading
The trader’s total stock inventory and cash amount are sums of those from trading hidden
and displayed orders, being
Ih,Z(t) = I0 + I
h(t) + IZ(t) and Ch,Z(t) = C0 + C
h(t) + CZ(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (3.6)
where the real numbers I0 and C0 are the initial stock inventory and the initial cash amount,
and the processes Ih, Ch, IZ and CZ are defined in the equations (2.3), (3.1) and (3.1).
When there is no ambiguity on which trading strategies are used, the superscripts in the
stock inventory Ih,Z and the cash amount Ch,Z are omitted.
Let rI ∈ (−∞,∞) and rC ∈ (0,∞) be two real numbers and
F : R× N× N→ R; (z, pa, pb) 7→ F (z, pa, pb),
be a measurable function with quadratic growth.
Assumption 3.1 There exists a constant rF > 0, such that for all z ∈ R and all pb ≤ pa,
we have ∣∣F (z, pa, pb)∣∣ ≤ rF ((z)2 + (pa)2 + (pb)2 + 1)
and ∣∣F (z1, pa, pb)− F (z2, pa, pb)∣∣ ≤ rF (|pa|+ |pb|+ 1) (|z1|+ |z2|+ 1) |z1 − z2|.
The trading activities are measured by the reward
ξ (I(T ), C(T )) = rCC(T ) + rIF
(
I(T ), P a(T ), P b(T )
)
. (3.7)
The trader’s objective of maximizing the reward in expectation is formulated as a stochastic
control problem.
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Problem 3.1 (1) An internalizing trader looks for an optimal trading strategy
Z∗ = (Za∗, Zb∗, βa∗, βb∗) ∈ Z int and h∗ = (ha∗, hb∗) ∈ H to achieve the maximum expected
reward
V mix,int(ǫ) := sup
(Za,Zb,βa,βb)∈Z int,(ha,hb)∈H
E
[
ξ
(
Ih,Z(T ), Ch,Z(T )
)]
. (3.8)
The reward V mix,int(ǫ) is a function of the premium ǫ, because the cash amount Ch,Z(T ) is
a function of ǫ.
(2) A regular trader looks for an optimal trading strategy Z∗ = (Za∗, Zb∗, 0, 0) ∈ Z reg and
h∗ = (ha∗, hb∗) ∈ H to achieve the maximum expected reward
V mix,reg := sup
(Za,Zb,0,0)∈Z reg ,(ha,hb)∈H
E
[
ξ
(
Ih,Z(T ), Ch,Z(T )
)]
.
Control problems with reward functions of the form (3.2) have a five dimensional state pro-
cess (Qa, Qb, I, P a, P b). Problem 3.1 is still solvable for reward functions that are not linear
in C(T ), in which case the state process will have the cash amount C a sixth dimension.
Assumption 3.1 is a technical assumption under which Problem 4.1 and thus Problem 3.1
are well-posed.
Several common situations where the reward criteria satisfy Assumption 3.1 are linear com-
bination of the cash and inventory, liquidating or filling a certain number of stock shares, and
holding cash only at the terminal time, corresponding to the following forms of ξ(I(T ), C(T ))
defined in (3.2):
(1) ξ(I(T ), C(T )) = rCC(T ) + rII(T );
(2) ξ(I(T ), C(T )) = rCC(T ) + rI |I(T )− z0| or ξ(I(T ), C(T )) = r
CC(T ) + rI(I(T )− z0)
2;
(3) ξ(I(T ), C(T )) = rCC(T ) + rI
(
1{I(T )>0}(P
b(T )− U b) + 1{I(T )<0}(P
a(T ) + Ua)
)
I(T ).
(3.9)
The criterion (3.2)(1) means that the trader has a utility function linear in cash and inven-
tory. In (3.2)(2), the coefficient rI is negative, and the constant z0 is the number of shares
that the trader would like to hold at the terminal time T . In (3.2)(3), the coefficient rI is
positive and Ua and U b are two positive integers; if the terminal inventory I(T ) is positive,
the trader sells all his stocks at the price (P b(T )−U b) per share; if I(T ) is negative, he pays
the price (P a(T ) + Ua) for each share.
Remark 3.1 In application, a trader in a hedge fund or a proprietary trading firm is entitled
to both buying and selling during any trading period, hence Za, Zb, ha and hb can be all
positive. For a trader in a brokerage agency, if he trades during the time [0, T ] to fill a buy
(sell) order for the customer, a simplest way to comply with the regulations is not to sell
(buy) throughout the same time period, hence, when using the results in this paper, he should
set Zb(t) ≡ 0, βb(t) ≡ 0 and hb(t) ≡ 0 (respectively Za(t) ≡ 0, βa(t) ≡ 0 and ha(t) ≡ 0)
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Especially, a regular trader sets βa ≡ βb ≡ 0. The brokerage agency’s
admissible set of equivalent price switching strategies is a modification of Definition 4.1 by
setting ubn ≡ −(N
b(Sn)−N
b(Sn−)) and h
b(t) ≡ 0 (respectively uan ≡ −(N
a(Sn)−N
a(Sn−))
and ha(t) ≡ 0). Optimizing over the buying (selling) strategies only is a special case of the
algorithm in subsection 6.2.
4 The optimal switching problem
This section presents the problem of how the trader could optimally switch the bid and ask
prices and shows the well-posedness of the optimal switching problem. Compared to the
optimal trading Problem 3.1, price switching considers a smaller and simpler set of active
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trading strategies, which are discretely re-balanced strategies in the form of the times to
trade and the number of limits to fill at each time.
4.1 Switching prices
Let [u] and {u} respectively denote the integer part and the fractional part of a real number
u. The identity u = [u] + {u} holds. Switching the prices means that the trader chooses a
sequence of times {Sn}
∞
n=1 and two sequences of positive numbers {u
a
n}
∞
n=1 and {u
b
n}
∞
n=1,
such that the ask and bid prices are pushed from P a(Sn−1) to P
a(Sn) = P
a(Sn−1) + [u
a
n]
and from P b(Sn−1) to P
b(Sn) = P
b(Sn−1) − [u
b
n]. The ask and bid prices stay constants
over every time interval (Sn−1, Sn).
In the limit order book where the trader and the rest of the market participants all act,
a price change could occur due to two possible reasons.
(1) Limit orders at the ask or bid price is depleted by the noise trader, or limit orders
arrive within the spread. Suppose the previous time of price switching is Sn−1, then the
next time Tn when either event happens can be expressed as
Tn := inf{Sn−1 < t ≤ T |Q
a(Sn−1) + σ
a(W a(t)−W a(Sn−1)) = 0, N
a(t)−Na(Sn−1) = 1,
Qb(Sn−1) + σ
b(W b(t)−W b(Sn−1)) = 0, or N
b(t)−N b(Sn−1) = 1} ∧ T.
(4.1)
(2) The trader fills all the shares at the ask or bid price and, at his choice, some limits
beyond the best prices. If he trades at some time Sn ∈ (Sn−1, Tn), then he has to fill all the
shares at either the ask price or the bid price to trigger a price change.
After the (n − 1)th price switching at the time Sn−1, if he waits until the time Tn, the
trader may choose to fill some shares at time Tn; even if he does not trade, the rest of the
market will switch the prices at time Tn any way, in which case the time of the nth price
switching is set as Sn = Tn. Requiring that the trader has to “trade” at time Tn, though
possibly zero share, makes sure that the prices are constants between two switching times
and gives a neater expression of the order book dynamics.
Furthermore, formulating with the help of Tn’s reduces the price switching problem from
seven-dimensional path-dependent to five-dimensional Markovian. The actual controlled
state process is
{(Qa(t−), Qb(t−), Iα(t−) + Ih(t), P a(t−), P b(t−), Na(t), N b(t))}0≤t≤T .
Since what matters in (Na(t), N b(t)) is their exponentially distributed arrival times, the
trader only need to monitor whether or not there is an arrival of limit sell or buy orders within
the spread. Viewing the controlled arrival times Tn’s as a sequence of exit times when deci-
sion marking has to take place, the state process is simplified to {(Qa(t−), Qb(t−), Iα(t−)+
Ih(t), P a(t−), P b(t−))}0≤t≤T .
The admissible price switching strategies are switching controls defined below.
Definition 4.1 (switching control) The admissible set of switching controls of an internal-
izing trader and that of a regular trader are denoted respectively as A int and A reg. Let the
letter j represent either the superscripts “int” or the superscript “reg”. The admissible set
A j consists of switching controls α := {(Sn, u
a
n, u
b
n)}
∞
n=0 satisfying, for every n = 1, 2, · · · ,
the three criteria below, with the convention that S0 = u
a
0 = u
b
0 = 0.
(1) The switching time Sn is an F -stopping time such that 0 ≤ S1 < · · · < Sn−1 < Sn < · · · .
If Sn−1 ≥ T , then Sn = T +1; if Sn−1 < T , then Sn ∈ (Sn−1, Tn], where Tn defined in (4.1)
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is the next time of price change if the trader does not trade.
(2) For the same positive integers p¯a and pb as in Definition 3.1, we have (uan, u
b
n) ∈
U j(Sn, P
a(Sn−1), P
b(Sn−1)), where
U
j(t, pa, pb) :=


{0, 1, · · · , (p¯a − pa)+} × {0, 1, · · · , (pb − pb)+} \ {(0, 0)},
if t < Tn, or Q
i(t−) = 0, i = a or b;
Dj(p¯a − pa) ∪ {2, · · · , (p¯a − pa)+} × {0, 1, · · · , (pb − pb)+},
if Na(t)−Na(t−) = 1;
{0, 1, · · · , (p¯a − pa)+} ×Dj(pb − pb) ∪ {2, · · · , (pb − pb)+},
if N b(t)−N b(t−) = 1;
[0, (p¯a − pa)+]× [0, (pb − pb)+], if t = T ;
{(0, 0)}, if t = T + 1.
(4.2)
In expression (4.1), the sets Dj(p¯a − pa) and Dj(pb − pb) of real numbers are defined as
Dint(x) :=


[−1, 1], if x ≥ 1;
{−1, 0}, if x = 0;
{−1}, if x ≤ −1
(4.3)
for an internalizing trader, and as
Dreg(x) :=


{−1, 0, 1}, if x ≥ 1;
{−1, 0}, if x = 0;
{−1}, if x ≤ −1.
(4.4)
for a regular trader. For j = int, reg and t ∈ [0, T ], the set A jt is defined the same as A
j
except that S0 = t. Also, we denote by
A
j
t,1 :=
{(
S1, u
a
1 , u
b
1)
∣∣α = {(Sn, uan, ubn)}∞n=0 ∈ A jt }
the set of the first elements of all switching controls in A jt .
In Definition 4.1, Criterion (1) specifies the trading times Sn. Criterion (2) specifies the
possible numbers of limits to buy and sell at each transaction. Setting Sn = T + 1 means
the trader no longer trades, hence there has to be uan = u
b
n = 0.
The admissible switching control sets of an internalizing trader and a regular trader are
different only up to the sets Dint and Dreg defined in (4.1) and (4.1). Throughout this
paper, when a claim is valid for a trader regardless of whether he is internalizing or regular,
the admissible switching control sets will be generically denoted as A , At and At,1.
For n = 1, 2, · · · , at every time Sn a switching control α ∈ A causes the ask price to
increase from P a(Sn−1) to P
a(Sn) = P
a(Sn−1) + [u
a
n] and the bid price to decrease from
P b(Sn−1) to P
b(Sn) = P
b(Sn−1)− [u
b
n]. By enumerating all the situations that could trigger
a price change, the order book dynamics and the changes in the stock inventory and cash
amount can be summarized in compact formulae.
The order book dynamics can be written in terms of the switching control
α = {(Sn, u
a
n, u
b
n)}
∞
n=0 ∈ A :
the controlled prices move according to
P a(t) = P a(0) +
∑
n:Sn≤t
[uan], and P
b(t) = P b(0)−
∑
n:Sn≤t
[ubn], 0 ≤ t ≤ T ; (4.5)
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the controlled volumes move according to
Qi(t) =


Qi(0) + σiW i(t)
+
∑
n:Sn≤t
(
1{[uin] 6=0}
(
∆i −Qi(Sn−)
)
− 1{[uin]=0}{u
i
n}Q
i(Sn−)
)
, 0 ≤ t < T ;
∑
n:Sn=T
(1− {uin})
(
1{uin≥1}∆
i + 1{[uin]=0}Q
i(T−)
)
, t = T , i = a, b.
Defining the functions ga and gb : Ω× [0, T ]× [0,∞)× Z→ R as
gi(t, q, u) =
{
1{u≥1}
(
q + (u − 1)∆i
)
+ (N i(t)−N i(t−))
(
1{u≥0}∆
i + 1{[u]≤0}{u}q
)
, t < T ;
1{u≥1}(q + (u− 1)∆
i) + 1{[u]=0}u · q, t = T , i = a, b,
(4.6)
then ga (Sn, Q
a(Sn−), u
a
n) and g
b
(
Sn, Q
b(Sn−), u
b
n
)
are respectively the number of shares
that the trader buys and sells at the time Sn. The quantity
gα
(
Sn, Q
a(Sn−), Q
b(Sn−), u
a
n, u
b
n
)
:= ga (Sn, Q
a(Sn−), u
a
n)− g
b
(
Sn, Q
b(Sn−), u
b
n
)
is the change in the trader’s stock inventory from transactions at the time Sn.
Let ǫ be the premium that the trader pays his counterpart for filling each share at the
old price upon the arrival of limit orders at the new price. Defining the functions fa and
f b : Ω× [0, T ]× [0,∞)× Z× N→ R as
fa(t, q, p, u) =


1{u≥1}
(
p (q + (u− 1)∆a) +
1
2
u(u− 1)∆a
)
+ (Na(t)−Na(t−))
(
1{u≥0}(p− 1)∆
a + 1{[u]≤0}(p+ ǫ){u}q
)
, t < T ;
1{u≥1}
(
p (q + (u− 1)∆a) +
(
1
2
[u]([u]− 1) + [u] · {u}
)
∆a
)
+ 1{[u]=0}p · u · q, t = T,
(4.7)
and
f b(t, q, p, u) =


1{u≥1}
(
p
(
q + (u− 1)∆b
)
+
1
2
u(u− 1)∆b
)
+ (N b(t)−N b(t−))
(
1{u≥0}(p+ 1)∆
b + 1{[u]≤0}(p− ǫ){u}q
)
, t < T ;
1{u≥1}
(
p
(
q + (u− 1)∆b
)
+
(
1
2
[u]([u]− 1) + [u] · {u}
)
∆b
)
+ 1{[u]=0}p · u · q, t = T,
then fa (Sn, Q
a(Sn−), P
a(Sn−), u
a
n) and f
b
(
Sn, Q
b(Sn−), P
b(Sn−), u
b
n
)
are respectively the
total cash amount that the trader pays the seller (receives from the buyer) of the stock for
transactions at the time Sn. The quantity
fα
(
Sn, Q
a(Sn−), Q
b(Sn−), P
a(Sn−), P
b(Sn−), u
a
n, u
b
n
)
:=− fa (Sn, Q
a(Sn−), P
a(Sn−), u
a
n) + f
b
(
Sn, Q
b(Sn−), P
b(Sn−), u
b
n
) (4.8)
is the change in the trader’s cash amount on his account from transactions at the time Sn.
Actively trading according to a generic switching control α ∈ A defined by Definition
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4.1, the trader’s inventory and cash amount from the displayed orders are respectively
Iα(t) =
∑
n:Sn≤t
gα
(
Sn, Q
a(Sn−), Q
b(Sn−), u
a
n, u
b
n
)
and
Cα(t) =
∑
n:Sn≤t
fα
(
Sn, Q
a(Sn−), Q
b(Sn−), P
a(Sn−), P
b(Sn−), u
a
n, u
b
n
)
, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
(4.9)
Taking into account the hidden orders, the trader’s total terminal stock inventory and
cash amount are respectively
I(T )h,α = I0 + I
h(T ) + Iα(T ) and Ch,α(T ) = C0 + C
h(T ) + Cα(T ), (4.10)
where the quantities Ih(T ) and Ch(T ) are defined in the equations (2.3). When there is no
ambiguity on which trading strategies are used, the superscripts in Ih,α(T ) and Ch,α(T ) are
omitted.
Since each transaction using active orders causes a change in the prices, the trader’s trading
activities are a matter of choosing when and to what level to “switch” the ask and bid prices.
The profit or cost from switching at time Sn is the change in his cash amount expressed as
the quantity in (4.1). This is why we give the name “price switching” to the set of discretely
re-balances trading strategies introduced in this section. Optimizing the trading algorithm
over all the price switching strategies is a problem of switching control with impact on the
state process.
Problem 4.1 (1) An internalizing trader looks for an admissible switching control α∗ ∈
A int and an optimal hidden order strategy h∗ ∈ H that achieve the supremum
V swt,int(ǫ) := sup
α∈A int, h∈H
E[ξ(I(T )h,α, Ch,α(T ))]. (4.11)
Same as in Problem 3.1, the reward V swt,int(ǫ) is a function of the premium ǫ.
(2) A regular trader looks for an admissible switching control α∗ ∈ A reg and an optimal
hidden order strategy h∗ ∈ H that achieve the supremum
V swt,reg := sup
α∈A reg , h∈H
E[ξ(I(T )h,α, Ch,α(T ))].
Generically for either an internalizing trader or a regular trader, Problem 4.1 requires finding
an admissible switching control α∗ ∈ A and an optimal hidden order strategy h∗ ∈ H that
achieve the supremum
sup
α∈A , h∈H
E[ξ(I(T )h,α, Ch,α(T ))]
= sup
α∈A , h∈H
E
[
rC
∞∑
n=1
fα
(
Sn, Q
a(Sn−), Q
b(Sn−), P
a(Sn−), P
b(Sn−), u
a
n, u
b
n
)
+ rCCh(T ) + rIF (Ih,α(T ), P a(T ), P b(T ))
]
.
(4.12)
The value process V of (4.1) is defined as
V (t) := sup
α∈At, h∈Ht
E [ξ(I(T ), C(T ))|F (t)] − rCC(t). (4.13)
Then the best expected reward (4.1) can be written as
sup
α∈A , h∈H
E[ξ(I(T ), C(T ))] = rCC0 + V (0).
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4.2 Well-posedness of the problem
Before looking for an optimal trading strategy that achieves the supremum in (4.1), it is
necessary to verify that the optimal switching problem is well-defined. In other words, is
the value process V in (4.1) finite? This subsection will prove that the answer is yes. Later
in Proposition 5.1, we shall see that the optimal price switching problems provide lower
and upper bounds of the value functions of the optimal trading problem, hence the optimal
trading problem is consequently also well-posed. By Theorem 5.1(6)(8) and Proposition 5.1,
we shall see that
V swt,reg ≤ V swt,int(ǫ), V mix,int(ǫ) and V mix,reg ≤ V swt,int(0).
It suffices to prove the well-posedness of the regular trader’s price switching problem and the
internalizing trader’s price switching problem with zero premium. Then the well-posedness
of Problem 3.1 and Problem 4.1 all follows.
Throughout this subsection, the premium ǫ equals zero.
The well-posedness is stated as Theorem 4.1 at the end of this subsection. To prepare
for the proof of the theorem, Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 will respectively provide uniform
L2 or L1 bounds of the prices (P a(T ), P b(T )), the stock inventory Ih,α(T ) and the cash
amount Ch,α(T ) for all admissible switching controls. Because the reward criterion ξ de-
fined in (3.2) is a function of (P a(T ), P b(T )), Ih,α(T ) and Ch,α(T ), the two Lemmas lead to
Theorem 4.1. In addition, an interpretation worth noting of Lemma 4.1 is that the trader’s
trading activities will not push the prices towards explosion.
Lemma 4.1 There exists a constant c1 > 0, such that for any admissible switching control
α ∈ A defined by Definition 4.1, the controlled ask and bid prices at any time t ∈ [0, T ] has
the L2 bounds
E
[
(P a(t))
2
]
≤(P a(0))2 + (p¯a)2 + c1T
(
((θa∗)2 + 1)T + θa∗ + 1
)
;
E
[(
P b(t)
)2]
≤(P b(0))2 + (pb)2 + c1T
(
((θb∗)2 + 1)T + θb∗ + 1
)
,
(4.14)
where the constants θa∗ and θb∗ defined in (2.1) are the maximum arrival rates of limit
orders within the spread.
Proof. The total number of downward (upward) movements in the ask (bid) price equals the
number of times N i that limit sell (buy) orders arrive within the spread. The total number
of upward (downward) movements in the ask (bid) price equals the number of limits that
the trader has filled plus the number of times when the volume at the ask (bid) price is
depleted by the rest of the market. The total number of depletions at the ask (bid) price by
the rest of the market participants does not exceed a renewal process Ri with independent
inter-arrival times identically distributed as the leverage hitting time
inf
{
0 ≤ t ≤ T
∣∣∆i + σiW i(t) ≤ 0} ∧ T , for i = a, b.
The highest ask (lowest bid) price happens when no limit sell (buy) orders arrive within the
spread and the trader fills all the limit sell (buy) order below the price p¯a (above the price
pb). The lowest ask (highest bid) price happens when there is no depletion by the trader or
the noise trader, and limit sell (buy) orders arrive according to the largest possible intensity.
The prices have the upper and lower bounds
P a(0)−Na(T ) ≤ P a(0)−Na(t) ≤ P a(t) ≤ p¯a ∨ P a(0) + Ra(t) ≤ p¯a ∨ P a(0) +Ra(T );
pb ∧ P b(0)−Rb(T ) ≤ pb ∧ P b(0)−Rb(t) ≤ P b(t) ≤ P b(0) +N b(t) ≤ P b(0) +N b(T ).
(4.15)
Using the inequalities in (4.2) and the bounds for variances of stationary renewal processes
derived in [15] Daley (1978), we get the inequalities in (4.1). 
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Lemma 4.2 There exist positive constants c2 and c3, such that for any admissible switching
control α ∈ A defined by Definition 4.1 and any hidden order strategy h ∈ H defined by
Definition 2.1, the trader’s total cash amount and stock inventory from the strategies α and
h have the bounds
E[|Ch(T ) + Cα(T )|] ≤ c2
(
(Qa(0))2 + (Qb(0))2 + (P a(0))2 + (P b(0))2 + T 2 + 1
)
(4.16)
and
E[|I0 + Ih(T ) + Iα(T )|2]
≤c3
(
(Qa(0))4 + (Qb(0))4 + (I0)
2 + (P a(0))4 + (P b(0))4 + T 4 + 1
)
.
(4.17)
Proof. Throughout the time interval [0, T ], the ask price P a (bid price P b) moves downward
Na(T ) times (upward N b(T ) times). At least one limit at a time, the trader could take at
most all the initially existing displayed limit sell (buy) orders and all the displayed limit
sell (buy) orders ever arriving within the spread, as long as the ask (bid) price is below p¯a
(above pb). Then the total number of limits that the trader would ever buy (sell) until time
T does not exceed (p¯a − P a(0))+ + Na(T ) (respectively (P b(0) − pb)+ + N b(T )). At any
time t ∈ [0, T ], each limit of limit sell (buy) orders contains no more than ∆a + Qa(0) +
2σa sup
0≤t≤T
|W a(t)| (respectively ∆b + Qb(0) + 2σb sup
0≤t≤T
|W b(t)|) shares. Each time buying
(selling), it is impossible to take more than the number of all the currently existing limit
sell (buy) orders below (above) the price p¯a (respectively pb). We may bound the stock
inventory and cash amount from displayed orders by
|Iα(T )| ≤
(
(p¯a − P a(0))+ +Na(T )
)(
∆a +Qa(0) + 2σa sup
0≤t≤T
|W a(t)|
)
+
(
(P b(0)− pb)+ +N b(T )
)(
∆b +Qb(0) + 2σb sup
0≤t≤T
|W b(t)|
)
;
|Cα(T )| ≤ (p¯a + ǫ)
(
(p¯a − P a(0))+ +Na(T )
)(
∆a +Qa(0) + 2σa sup
0≤t≤T
|W a(t)|
)
+
(
pb + ǫ
) (
(P b(0)− pb)+ +N b(T )
)(
∆b +Qb(0) + 2σb sup
0≤t≤T
|W b(t)|
)
.
(4.18)
Considering the hidden orders, the trader could receive at most ∆aHa(T ) shares of hidden
limit sell orders and ∆bHb(T ) shares of hidden limit buy orders. The greatest possible price
for each share does not exceed the bounds in (4.2). The stock inventory and cash amount
from hidden orders can be bounded by
|Ih(T )| ≤∆aHa(T ) + ∆bHb(T );
|Ch(T )| ≤∆aHa(T ) (P a(0) + p¯a +Na(T ) +Ra(T ) + 1)
+ ∆bHb(T )
(
P b(0) + pb +N b(T ) +Rb(T ) + 1
)
.
(4.19)
By the inequations (4.2) and (4.2), by Lemma 4.1, and by applying Burkholder-Gundy-Davis
inequality to sup
0≤t≤T
|W a(t)| and sup
0≤t≤T
|W b(t)|, the claim in this lemma can be justified. 
Theorem 4.1 There exists a constant c4 > 0, such that for any switching control α ∈ A
and any hidden order strategy h ∈ H , we have
E
[∣∣ξ (C(T ), I(T ))− rCC0∣∣]
≤c4
(
(Qa(0))4 + (Qb(0))4 + (I0)
2 + (P a(0))4 + (P b(0))4 + T 4 + 1
)
<∞.
(4.20)
Furthermore, for all t ∈ [0, T ], the value process V (t) defined in (4.1) has the growth rate
|V (t)| ≤ c4
(
(Qa(t))4 + (Qb(t))4 + (I(t))2 + (P a(t))4 + (P b(t))4 + (T − t)4 + 1
)
. (4.21)
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Proof. By Assumption 3.1 (1), equation (3.2) and equation (4.1), we know that
|ξ(C(T ), I(T ))− rCC0| ≤ |r
C | · |Ch(T )+Cα(T )|+ |rI | ·rF (|z+ Ih(T )+ Iα(T )|2+1). (4.22)
Substituting the inequalities (4.2) and (4.2) into inequality (4.2) gives the inequality (4.1).
Because of the Markov property of the order book dynamics, the inequality in (4.1) can be
derived in the same way as (4.1). 
Theorem 4.1 implies that the value process V defined in (4.1) indeed exists and is finite.
5 Relation between trading and price switching
This section will state in Theorem 5.1 the relation between Problem 3.1 and Problem 4.1.
Deriving from Theorem 5.1, the result in Proposition 5.1 tells that the two price switching
algorithms provide lower and upper bounds of value functions of the two mixed trading
algorithms. Especially, when the premium ǫ equals zero, the internalizing trader’s optimal
mixed strategy can be achieved among the set of price switching strategies.
Remark 5.1 The results in this section will have three implications.
(1) They help prove well-posedness of all the control problems, as discussed at the begin-
ning of Subsection 4.2.
(2) When the upper and lower bounds in Proposition 5.1 do not differ much, e.g. in
Fig. 6.4, the implementable lower bound switching strategy is nearly optimal for the optimal
trading problem. Corollary 6.1 will show that the latter is much harder to compute.
(3) The MiFID framework defines different types of traders and strategies. Theorem 5.1
compares their best expected profits.
Definition 5.1 (step trading strategy) The admissible set of step trading strategy of an
internalizing trader and that of a regular trader are denoted respectively as S int and S reg.
Let the letter j represent either “int” or “reg”. Let α = {(Sn, u
a
n, u
b
n)}
∞
n=0 ∈ A
j be an
arbitrary admissible switching control. The processes Zaα and Z
b
α, being the total shares that
the trader has bought and sold according to the switching control α, are computed from
Ziα(t) =
∑
n:Sn≤t
gi
(
Sn, Q
i(Sn−), u
i
n
)
1{uin≥0}, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , i = a, b, (5.1)
where the mappings ga and gb are defined in (4.1). When limit orders arrive within the
spread, the proportion of shares that the trader fills at the old price P i(Sn−) is computed
from
βiα(t) =
{
{uin}1{uin∈[−1,0)}, if t = Sn and N
i(Sn)−N
i(Sn−) = 1;
0, otherwise; 0 ≤ t ≤ T , i = a, b.
(5.2)
The set S j of admissible step trading strategies is defined as the collection of all the trading
strategies Zα = (Z
a
α, Z
b
α, β
a
α, β
b
α) satisfying (5.1) and (5.1) for some switching control α ∈
A j. Namely, S int =
{
Zα|α ∈ A
int
}
and S reg = {Zα|α ∈ A
reg}.
Seen from Definition 4.1 and Definition 5.1, each step trading strategy of an internalizing
or regular trader is his price switching strategy denoted in terms of the total numbers of
shares bought and sold, so they are the same active trading strategy under different names.
The two definitions further imply that
S
reg =
{
Zα = (Z
a
α, Z
b
α, β
a
α, β
b
α) ∈ S
int|βaα(t) ≡ β
b
α(t) ≡ 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ]
}
.
Notation 5.1 (1) An internalizing trader’s best expected reward over step trading strategies
is denoted as
V stp,int(ǫ) := sup
Zα∈S int, h∈H
E
[
ξ
(
Ih,Zα(T ), Ch,Zα(T )
)]
.
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(2) A regular trader’s best expected reward over step trading strategies is denoted as
V stp,reg := sup
Zα∈S reg , h∈H
E
[
ξ
(
Ih,Zα(T ), Ch,Zα(T )
)]
.
Theorem 5.1 The value functions of the optimal trading problem and the optimal switching
problem have the relations
(1) V swt,reg = V stp,reg; (2) V swt,int(ǫ) = V stp,int(ǫ), for all ǫ ≥ 0;
(3) V stp,reg ≤ V mix,reg; (4) V stp,int(ǫ) ≤ V mix,int(ǫ), for all ǫ ≥ 0;
(5) V mix,reg ≤ V mix,int(ǫ), for all ǫ ≥ 0; (6) V swt,reg ≤ V swt,int(ǫ), for all ǫ ≥ 0;
(7) V mix,int(0) = V stp,int(0);
(8) Viewing ǫ as the variable, the two functions V swt,int(ǫ) and V mix,int(ǫ) are decreasing
in ǫ.
Theorem 5.1 can be proved by the results from the next subsections 5.1 and 5.2. An outline
of the proof is provided here.
Outline of Proof of Theorem 5.1 (1) and (2) By their definitions, step trading strategies
(Definition 5.1) and price switching strategies (Definition 4.1) have one-to-one correspon-
dence between each other, because the two sets in fact consist of the same active trading
strategies denoted in different terms. A price switching strategy denotes the times of trans-
actions and the numbers of limits to buy and sell at each time; a step strategy denotes
the total numbers of shares bought and sold up-to-date. This explains the first and last
identities in Theorem 5.1.
(3), (4), (5) and (6) The three inequalities come from the inclusions in Lemma 5.1.
(7) This identity comes from Lemma 5.2, Lemma 5.1(1) and Proposition 5.2. The main
idea of the proof is to construct, in Lemma 5.2, a step trading strategy Zα ∈ S
int that
path-wisely replicates the stock inventory and the cash amount produced by the mixed trad-
ing strategy Z ∈ Z int. By Lemma 5.1(1), every step trading strategy is a mixed trading
strategy. Furthermore, as will be shown by Proposition 5.2, an internalizing trader’s two
active trading strategies Z and Zα path-wisely result in the same bid ask prices, replacing
the former with the latter does not change the stock inventory and cash amount produced
by a passive strategy on the hidden orders.
(8) The quantities Ch,Z defined according to (3.1), (3.1), (3.1) and (3.2), and Ch,α defined
according to (4.1)-(6), viewed as functions in ǫ, are decreasing. The reward criterion ξ de-
fined in (3.2) is increasing in the cash amount, because the coefficient rC is positive. Hence
V mix,int(ǫ) defined in (3.1) and V swt,int(ǫ) defined in (4.1) are decreasing in ǫ. 
Proposition 5.1 The value functions of the price switching problem provide lower and
upper bounds for the value functions of the optimal trading problem. (1) If the optimal
trader is regular, then
V swt,reg ≤ V mix,reg ≤ V swt,int(0). (5.3)
(2) If the optimal trader is an internalizer, then
V mix,int(0) = V swt,int(0) (5.4)
and
V swt,int(ǫ) ≤ V mix,int(ǫ) ≤ V swt,int(0), for all ǫ ≥ 0. (5.5)
Proof. (1) The first inequality in (5.1) comes from Theorem 5.1(1)(3). The second inequal-
ity in (5.1) comes from Theorem 5.1(2)(5)(7).
(2) By Theorem 5.1(2)(7), the identity (5.1) holds. The first inequality in (5.1) comes from
Theorem 5.1(2)(4). To prove the second inequality in (5.1), by Theorem 5.1(8) it holds that
V mix,int(ǫ) ≤ V mix,int(0), the right hand side of which equals V swt,int(0) by (5.1). 
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5.1 Analysis of active strategies
It can be verified that the processes Zaα, Z
b
α, β
a
α and β
b
α defined in (5.1) and (5.1) satisfy
Definition 3.1, so every step trading strategy Zα = (Z
a
α, Z
b
α, β
a
α, β
b
α) ∈ S
j is a mixed trading
strategy in the admissible set Z j , for j = int, reg. However, the contrary is not true, because
a mixed trading strategy can be continuous over some time interval, but a step trading
strategy is a pure jump process. By Definition 3.1(2), a regular trader’s admissible set of
mixed trading strategies is the subset of an internalizing trader’s mixed trading strategies
that do not fill orders at the old price at the time of order arrival within the spread. By
their definitions in (4.1) and (4.1) of Definition 4.1, there is the set inclusion Dreg $ Dint. It
follows that a regular trader’s price switching strategy is a proper subset of an internalizing
trader’s price switching strategy.
Lemma 5.1 The admissible sets S int, S reg, A int, A reg, Z int and Z reg of trading strate-
gies defined in Definition 4.1 and Definition 5.1 have the inclusion relations
(1) S reg $ Z reg; (2) S int $ Z int; (3) Z reg $ Z int; (4) A reg $ A int; .
When the premium ǫ equals zero, the set of his admissible step trading strategies performs
equally well as an internalizing trader’s set of admissible mixed trading strategies, though
the former is a much smaller subset of the latter as stated in Lemma 5.1(1). Whatever stock
inventory and cash amount a mixed trading strategy can produce at the terminal time, an
internalizing trader can always find a step trading strategy that path-wisely does the same.
Hence an internalizing trader’s best expected reward can be achieved over a smaller and
simpler set of admissible trading strategies. This is the role of Lemma 5.2.
Lemma 5.2 Suppose the premium ǫ equals zero. For any admissible mixed trading strategy
Z = (Za, Zb, βa, βb) ∈ Z int, there exists an admissible switching control α = {(Sn, u
a
n, u
b
n)}
∞
n=0 ∈
A int such that the step trading strategy Zα = (Z
a
α, Z
b
α, β
a
α, β
b
α) ∈ S
int defined by (5.1) and
(5.1) for this α almost surely satisfies
IZ(T ) = IZα(T ) and CZ(T ) = CZα(T ). (5.6)
Outline of Proof. It suffices to construct a specific α′ = {(S′n, u
a′
n , u
b′
n )}
∞
n=0 ∈ A
int such
that the step trading strategy Zα′ = (Z
a
α′ , Z
b
α′ , β
a
α′ , β
b
α′) defined in (5.1) and (5.1) for this α
′
satisfies the identities in (5.2). Since the actual construction takes three pages, the detailed
proof is omitted from the paper. 
5.2 Effect on an internalizing trader’s hidden orders
Given an arbitrary admissible mixed trading strategy Z from the internalizing trader, let the
step trading strategy Zα′ , for some α
′ = {(S′n, u
a′
n , u
b′
n )}
∞
n=0 ∈ A
int, be the one constructed
in Lemma 5.2 to replicate the terminal stock inventory and cash amount. Let P aZ and P
b
Z
denote the price processes (3.1) controlled by the mixed trading strategy Z, and P aα′ and
P bα′ denote the price processes (4.1) controlled by the switching control α
′. The construction
is such that the two strategies also produce the same times and amounts of price change,
meaning that
P aZ(t) = P
a
α′(t) and P
b
Z(t) = P
b
α′(t), for all (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω. (5.7)
Let us recall that the intensities of the liquidity event processes Ha and Hb are functions
of the spread only. The equations (2.3) and (5.2) further imply that, both the inventory Ih
and cash amount Ch from an arbitrary hidden order strategy h = (ha, hb) ∈ H remain the
same regardless of whether the mixed trading strategy Z or the step trading strategy Zα′ is
used. The analysis in this paragraph has verified a reinforcement of Lemma 5.2, stated as
the proposition below.
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Proposition 5.2 Suppose the premium ǫ equals zero. Let h = (ha, hb) ∈ H be an arbitrary
hidden order strategy. For any admissible mixed trading strategy Z = (Za, Zb, βa, βb) ∈
Z int, there exists an admissible switching control α = {(Sn, u
a
n, u
b
n)}
∞
n=0 ∈ A
int such that
the step trading strategy Zα = (Z
a
α, Z
b
α, β
a
α, β
b
α) ∈ S
int defined in (5.1) and (5.1) for this α
almost surely satisfies
Ih,Z(T ) = Ih,Zα(T ) and Ch,Z(T ) = Ch,Zα(T ),
where Ih,Z(T ), Ih,Zα(T ), Ch,Z(T ) and Ch,Zα(T ) are defined in (3.2) and (4.1).
6 Solving the optimal switching problem
This section will provide the characterization of an optimal trading strategy and derive a
trading algorithm for the optimal switching Problem 4.1. The solution is valid regardless of
whether the trader is internalizing or regular, hence the admissible set of switching controls
is generically denoted as A . Before getting down to the solution, a few notations are intro-
duced.
The two-dimensional quantities representing both sides of the order book are denoted as
Q(t) = (Qa(t), Qb(t)), P (t) = (P a(t), P b(t)), q = (qa, qb), p = (pa, pb), u = (ua, ub) and
h = (ha, hb) for short. As will be shown in Theorem 6.1, the decision making would only need
to observe the state processes {(Na, N b)}0≤t≤T and {(Q(t−), I
α(t−)+Ih(t), P (t−))}0≤t≤T ,
which generate a smaller filtration than F (t). The domain of the process {(Q(t−), Iα(t−)+
Ih(t), P (t−))}0≤t≤T is denoted as
D = [0,∞)2 × R× {(pa, pb) ∈ (P a(0), P b(0)) + N2|pa > pb}.
To express the change in the order book and in the inventory from the trader’s transaction,
the mapping γ : Ω× [0, T ]×D × N2 → [0,∞)2 × R is defined as
γ(t, q, z, u) =

 1{ua 6=0}∆a + 1{ua=0}(1− {ua})qa1{ub 6=0}∆b + 1{ub=0}(1− {ub})qb
z + gα(t, q, u)


transpose
.
Immediately after applying the switching control u at time t, the volumes and inventory
become
(Q(t), I(t)) = γ
(
t, Q(t−), Iα(t−) + Ih(t), u
)
. (6.1)
The process {
∫ t
0
r(P (s−), h(s−))ds}0≤t≤T defined as
r(P (t), h(t)) =−∆aha(t)
((
P a(t) + P b(t)
)
/2
)
λa(P a(t)− P b(t))
+ ∆bhb(t)
((
P a(t) + P b(t)
)
/2
)
λb(P a(t)− P b(t)), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
is the finite variation part in the Doob-Meyer decomposition of the semimartingale Ch
defined in (2.3). By the bound in (4.2), the local martingale part of Ch is a martingale.
Then the value process V defined in (4.1) can be written alternatively as
V (t) = sup
α∈At, h∈Ht
E
[
rC
∞∑
n=1
fα (Sn, Q(Sn−), P (Sn−), un)
+ rC
∫ T
t
r(P (s−), h(s−))ds + rIF (Ih,α(T ), P (T ))
∣∣∣∣F (t)
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
(6.2)
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because E [ ξ(I(T ), C(T ))|F (t)] − rCC(t) equals the expectation on the right hand side of
the above equation. For every h ∈ H0,t, the process Y (· ;h) is defined as
Y (t;h) =
∫ t
0
r(P (s−), h(s−))ds+ V (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
For every measurable function φ : [0, T ]×D → R, the operator M is defined as
Mφ(t, q, z, p) = max
u∈U (t,p)
{
fα(t, q, p, u) + φ
(
t, γ(t, q, z, u), pa + [ua], pb − [ub]
)}
.
6.1 Optimal trading strategy
This subsection will eventually derive, in Proposition 6.1, expressions of an optimal price
switching strategy in terms of the value process. The methodology is based on the principle
that the value process of a control problem is a supermartingale, and becomes a martingale
if and only if the control is optimal. It is called the “martingale method”, first introduced
for optimal stopping problems in Snell (1952) and for stochastic control problems in Davis
(1979). The pivot of the arguments is the dynamic programming principle formulated in
our setting as Theorem 6.1. A reference of the dynamic programming principle is Fleming
and Soner (1993). Lemma 6.1 provides the right continuity of the value process, so that it
is a qualified candidate for using the Snell envelop technique to sequentially determine each
optimal time of trading. Lemma 6.2 is the characterization of the optimal trading strategy
from the martingality of the value process. Because Theorem 4.1 has shown that the value
process is finite, the expressions in Proposition 6.1 imply the existence of an optimal trading
strategy.
Theorem 6.1 (dynamic programming principle) Given (Q(t−), Iα(t−) + Ih(t), P (t−)) =
(q, z, p), there exist deterministic measurable functions v0, va and vb : [0, T ]×D → R, and
a mapping v : Ω × [0, T ] × D → R, such that the value process V defined by the equation
(4.1) satisfies
V (t) = v(t, q, z, p) =
{
v0(t, q, z, p), if N i(t)−N i(t−) = 0, i = a and b;
vi(t, q, z, p), if N i(t)−N i(t−) = 1, i = a or b.
(6.3)
The value functions v0, va and vb can be computed via the dynamic programming principle
v0
(
t, Q(t−), Iα(t−) + Ih(t), P (t−)
)
= sup
(S1,u1)∈At,1, h∈Ht,S1
E
[
rC
(
fα (S1, Q(S1−), P (S1−), u1) +
∫ S1
t
r(P (t), h(s−))ds
)
+ v
(
S1, γ
(
S1, Q(S1−), I
α(S1−) + I
h(S1), u1
)
, P a(S1−) + [u
a
1], P
b(S1−)− [u
b
1]
) ∣∣∣∣F (t)
]
,
(6.4)
when Na(t)−Na(t−) = 0 and N b(t)−N b(t−) = 0, and
vi
(
t, Q(t−), Iα(t−) + Ih(t), P (t−)
)
= M v0
(
t, Q(t−), Iα(t−) + Ih(t), P (t−)
)
(6.5)
when N i(t) − N i(t−) = 1, i = a, b. Especially, at the terminal time T , the value function
satisfies the terminal condition
v
(
T,Q(T−), Iα(T−) + Ih(T ), P (T−)
)
= MF (I(T−), P (T−)). (6.6)
Proof. The existence of the functions v0, va and vb comes from the Markovian structure of
the processes (Q, I, P ), and the memoryless property of the exponential inter-arrival times
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for the orders within the spread. In our context, the proof of the dynamic programming
principle is routine. To wit, take arbitrary α ∈ At and h ∈ Ht as defined in Definitions 4.1
and 2.1, and denote for short
Σ1 =rC
(
fα (S1, Q(S1−), P (S1−), u1) +
∫ S1
t
r(P (t), h(s−))ds
)
;
Σ2 =rC
∞∑
n=2
(
fα (Sn, Q(Sn−), P (Sn−), un) +
∫ Sn
Sn−1
r (P (Sn−1), h(s−)) ds
)
+ rIF (I(T ), P (T ));
Σ3 =v
(
S1, γ
(
S1, Q(S1−), I
α(S1−) + I
h(S1), u1
)
, P a(S1−) + [u
a
1 ], P
b(S1−)− [u
b
1]
)
.
Then by the same reasoning that derives equation (6) and by the law of iterated expectations,
we have
E [ξ(I(T ), C(T ))|F (t)] − rCC(t) = E
[
Σ1 + E
[
Σ2 |F (S1)
]∣∣F (t)] . (6.7)
Because
Σ3 = sup
α∈AS1 , h∈HS1
E
[
Σ2 |F (S1)
]
(6.8)
by equations (6) and (6.1), we know that
E
[
Σ2 |F (S1)
]
≤ Σ3.
Taking supremum over (S1, u1) ∈ At,1 on both sides of the inequality
E
[
Σ1 + E
[
Σ2 |F (S1)
]∣∣F (t)] ≤ E [Σ1 + Σ3∣∣F (t)]
and using the equations (4.1) and (6.1), we prove that V (t) is less than or equal to the right
hand side of (6.1).
We know from equations (4.1) and (6.1) that
V (t) ≥ E
[
Σ1 + E
[
Σ2 |F (S1)
]∣∣F (t)] , (6.9)
for arbitrary α ∈ At and h ∈ Ht. The expressions (6.1) and (6.1) imply that
V (t) ≥ E
[
Σ1 +Σ3
∣∣F (t)] ,
and thus V (t) greater than or equal to the right hand side of (6.1). Both sides of the
inequality hold, hence
V (t) = sup
(S1,u1)∈At,1, h∈Ht,S1
E
[
rC
(
fα (S1, Q(S1−), P (S1−), u1) +
∫ S1
t
r(P (t), h(s−))ds
)
+ v
(
S1, γ
(
S1, Q(S1−), I
α(S1−) + I
h(S1), u1
)
, P a(S1−) + [u
a
1 ], P
b(S1−)− [u
b
1]
) ∣∣∣∣F (t)
]
.
(6.10)
When Na(t)−Na(t−) = 0 and N b(t)−N b(t−) = 0, by (6.1) there is
V (t) = v0
(
t, Q(t−), Iα(t−) + Ih(t), P (t−)
)
,
hence (6.1) takes the form (6.1). When Na(t) − Na(t−) = 1 or N b(t) − N b(t−) = 1 or
t = T , the trader has to “trade” at time t, though possibly zero share, hence (6.1) takes the
form (6.1) or (6.1). 
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Lemma 6.1 For every 0 ≤ t < t + ∆t ≤ T , suppose the trader does not trade over the
time interval [t, t + ∆t]. Then the processes
{
vi
(
t, Q(t−), Iα(t−) + Ih(t), P (t−)
)}
0≤t≤T
,
i = 0, a, b, are continuous in the time t, meaning that
lim
|t−t′|→0+
∣∣vi (t, Q(t−), Iα(t−) + Ih(t), P (t−))− vi (t′, Q(t′−), Iα(t′−) + Ih(t′), P (t′−))∣∣ = 0.
Proof. It suffices to prove the continuity of v0, then the continuity of va and vb follows
from the expression (6.1).
Take two arbitrary times t ≤ t′ ∈ [0, T ], an arbitrary price switching strategy α ∈ At and
an arbitrary hidden order strategy h ∈ Ht. Denote ∆t := t
′−t. Suppose Na(t)−Na(t−) = 0
and N b(t)−N b(t−) = 0.
(continuity in the volume q) For any two sets of initial values (q, z, p) and (q′, z, p) ∈ D ,
the resulted state processes are respectively denoted as (Q, I, P ) and (Q′, I ′, P ′). If the
trader never trades, then, taking the ask side for example, there are three possibilities of the
dynamics.
(1) Limit sell orders arrive in the spread before either Qa(·) = qa + σa(W a(·) −W a(t))
or Qa
′
(·) = qa
′
+ σa(W a(·)−W a(t)) reaches zero, in which case the new ask prices P a and
P a
′
equal pa − 1 and the volumes Qa and Qa
′
both become ∆a at the time of arrival.
(2) Limit sell orders does not arrive in the spread before both Qa(·) and Qa
′
(·) reach
zero. At the time of arrival the new ask prices P a and P a
′
equal pa+1 and the volumes Qa
and Qa
′
still differ by
∣∣∣qa − qa′ ∣∣∣.
(3) Limit sell orders arrive in the spread when one of Qa(·) and Qa
′
(·) has reached zero
and the other one has not.
In cases (1) and (2), the difference in the trader’s stock inventory does not exceed∣∣∣qa − qa′∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣qb − qb′ ∣∣∣, and that in the cash amount does not exceed (p¯a + ǫ) ∣∣∣qa − qa′∣∣∣ +(
pb + ǫ
) ∣∣∣qb − qb′ ∣∣∣. The probability that type (3) events ever happen over the entire time
horizon [0, T ] converges to zero, as
∣∣∣qa − qa′ ∣∣∣ → 0. By Assumption 3.1 (2) and from the
bounds of the price, stock inventory and cash amount in Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, we
know that
v0(t, q, z, p) = lim
q′→q
v0(t, q′, z, p). (6.11)
(continuity in the time t) Take any initial values (q, z, p) ∈ D and any number ∆t ∈
[0, T − t]. Let At(T − ∆t) denote the active trading strategies with the terminal time T
replaced by T −∆t. Then there is the relation
v0(t+∆t, q, z, p) =
(
sup
α∈At(T−∆t),h∈Ht
E [ξ(I(T −∆t), C(T −∆t))|F (t)] − rCC(t)
)
.
Because the change in the order book dynamics during the time interval [T − ∆t, T ] is of
the order O(∆t), the best expected reward from terminating at the time T −∆t or at the
time T differs up to O(∆t), meaning that
v0(t, q, z, p) = v0(t+∆t, q, z, p) +O(∆t). (6.12)
The continuity of the process
{
v0
(
t, Q(t−), Iα(t−) + Ih(t), P (t−)
)}
0≤t≤T
can be con-
cluded from the identities (6.1) and (6.1) and from the properties of Brownian motions and
Poisson processes that drive the state process. 
The proofs of Lemma 6.2 and Proposition 6.1 follow the routine procedure on how to char-
acterize the optimal control and optimal stopping time via the martingale method. Because
they are very long, the proofs are not provided here. Interested readers could find the orig-
inal idea in Davis (1979) and Snell (1952), and the arguments for a most similar result in
Section 2.2.2 of Li (2011).
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Lemma 6.2 The price switching strategy α∗ = (S∗1 , u
∗
1) ∈ At,1 and hidden order strategy
h∗ ∈ Ht,S∗
1
achieve the supremum in (6.1), if and only if all of the four conditions below hold.
(1) {Y (t ;h)}0≤t≤T1 is a supermartingale, for every h ∈ Ht,T1 ;
(2) {Y (t ∧ S∗1 ;h
∗)}0≤t≤T1 is a martingale;
(3) either
(
v0 −M v0
) (
S∗1 , Q(S
∗
1−), I
α∗(S∗1−) + I
h∗(S∗1 ), P (S
∗
1−)
)
= 0, or S∗1 = T1;
(4) u∗1 = arg max
u∈U (S∗
1
,P (t))
{
rC
(
fα(S
∗
1 , Q(S
∗
1−), P (t), u
∗
1) +
∫ S∗1
t
r(P (t), h∗(s−))ds
)
+v
(
S∗1 , γ(S
∗
1 , Q(S
∗
1−), I
α∗(S∗1−) + I
h∗(S∗1 ), u
∗
1), P
a(t) + [ua∗1 ], P
b(t)− [ub∗1 ]
)}
.
Proposition 6.1 There exist an optimal switching control α∗ = {(S∗n, u
a∗
n , u
b∗
n )}
∞
n=1 ∈ A
and an optimal hidden order strategy h∗ = (ha∗, hb∗) ∈ H , which are defined in the following
way. Let S∗0 = u
a∗
0 = u
b∗
0 = 0. For n = 1, 2, · · · , the optimal trading time S
∗
n can be expressed
as
S∗n =


inf
{
S∗n−1 < t ≤ T
∣∣ (v0 −M v0) (t, Q(t−), Iα∗(t−) + Ih∗(t), P (t−)) = 0} ∧ Tn,
if S∗n−1 < T ;
T + 1, if S∗n−1 = T.
If S∗n = T + 1 , then u
a∗
n = u
b∗
n = 0; otherwise
u∗n = arg max
u∈U (S∗n,P (S
∗
n−1
))
{
rCfα(S
∗
n, Q(S
∗
n−), P (S
∗
n−1), u)
+ v
(
S∗n, γ(S
∗
n, Q(S
∗
n−), I
α∗(S∗n−) + I
h∗(S∗n), u), P
a(S∗n−1) + [u
a], P b(S∗n−1)− [u
b]
)}
.
Denoting as
r0
(
t, Q(t), Iα
∗
(t) + Ih
∗
(t−), P (t), h(t)
)
:=
(
v0
(
t, Q(t), Iα
∗
(t) + Ih
∗
(t−) + ∆a, P (t)
)
− v0
(
t, Q(t), Iα
∗
(t) + Ih
∗
(t−), P (t)
))
· ha(t)λa
(
P a(t)− P b(t)
)
+
(
v0
(
t, Q(t), Iα
∗
(t) + Ih
∗
(t−)−∆b, P (t)
)
− v0
(
t, Q(t), Iα
∗
(t) + Ih
∗
(t−), P (t)
))
· hb(t)λb
(
P a(t)− P b(t)
)
,
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the optimal hidden order strategy h∗ can be expressed as
h∗(t) = arg max
h(t)∈{0,1}2
{
r (P (t), h(t)) + r0
(
t, Q(t), Iα
∗
(t) + Ih
∗
(t−), P (t), h(t)
)}
.
6.2 Numerical algorithm
This subsection will present the numerical algorithm to compute the value function and
optimal trading strategy for the discretized version of the optimal price switching Problem
4.1. We shall specify different complexities of this algorithm on a serial computer and on a
GPU cluster.
The time and the state process are discretized over a grid T ×X , where T as the grid for
the time t ∈ [0, T ] is defined as
T ={0 = t0, t1, t2, · · · , tK = T } = {0,∆t, 2∆t, · · · ,K∆t = T }
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and X as the grid for the state process (Q, I, P ) is a bounded set in D with |X | < ∞
elements. When the grid tends finer and finer, the limit
lim
K→∞, |X |→∞
T ×X
is assumed to be a dense set in [0, T ]×D .
The algorithm takes the three steps to be specified below. Its outputs will be the value
function and the optimal trading strategy (v¯0(tk, x), u¯
∗0(tk, x), h¯
∗(tk, x)) when limit orders
do not arrive within (tk−1, tk], and (v¯
i(tk, x), u¯
∗i(tk, x)) when limit sell (buy) orders arrive
within (tk−1, tk], for all (tk, x) ∈ T ×X . The pseudo codes are provided in Table 6.1.
Step 1. (at the terminal time) At the time tK = T , the terminal condition is v¯(T, x) =
MF (z, p).
Step 1.1 Compute the reward from trading at the terminal time for every trading strategy
u ∈ U (T, p) as
v¯(T, x;u) = v¯0(T, x;u) = v¯i(T, x;u) = fα(T, q, p, u) + F (z + gα(T, q, u), p).
Step 1.2 The maximum reward from trading at the terminal time is
v¯(T, x) = v¯0(T, x) = v¯i(T, x) = max{v¯(T, x;u)|u ∈ U (T, p)}.
The optimal trading strategy is
u¯∗(T, x) = {u ∈ U (T, p) | such that v¯(T, x;u) = v¯(T, x)}.

Step 2. (simulate the controlled state process) With the initial values
Xtk,x(tk;u) := (Qtk,x(tk;u), Itk,x(tk;u), Ptk,x(tk;u)) =
(
γ(tk, q, z, p, u), p
a + [ua], pb − [ub]
)
,
simulate the state process
Xtk,x(tk+1;u, h) = (Qtk,x(tk+1;u), Itk,x(tk+1;u, h), Ptk,x(tk+1;u)) (6.13)
according to

Q˜itk,x(tk+1;u) =Q
i
tk,x
(tk;u) + σ
i × (a Normal r.v. with mean zero and variance ∆t);
Qitk,x(tk+1;u) = Q˜
i
tk,x
(tk+1;u)1{Q˜itk,x(tk+1;u)>0}
+∆i1{Q˜itk,x(tk+1;u)≤0}
;
Itk,x(tk+1;u, h) = Itk,x(tk;u) + ∆
aha × (a Poisson r.v. with intensity λa(pa − pb)∆t)
−∆bhb × (a Poisson r.v. with intensity λb(pa − pb)∆t);
P atk,x(tk+1;u) = p
a + [ua] + 1{Q˜itk,x(tk+1;u)≤0}
;
P btk,x(tk+1;u) = p
b − [ub]− 1{Q˜itk,x(tk+1;u)≤0}
.
(6.14)
So that the state process remains within the grid X , the truncated value from each simu-
lation X¯tk,x(tk+1) is obtained from
X¯tk,x(tk+1;u, h) := argmin
{
|Xtk,x(tk+1;u, h)− y|
∣∣y ∈ X }. (6.15)
(It is possible to directly simulate the truncated values.)
Run M simulations to get X¯tk,x(tk+1;u, h) according to the equations (6.2), (6.2) and (6.2).
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The M simulated values are denoted as
{
X¯mtk,x(tk+1;u, h)
}M
m=1
. For i = a, b, simulate M
Poisson random variables
{
N im
}M
m=1
with the intensity θi(pa − pb)∆t to represent whether
limit orders arrive within the spread during the time interval (tk, tk+1]. 
Step 3. (value function and optimal trading strategy) This step conducts the optimiza-
tion procedure by the dynamic programming principle
v¯(tk, x) = max
u∈U (tk,p), h∈{0,1}2
{(
pa + pb
2
hbλb(pa − pb)−
pa + pb
2
haλa(pa − pb)
)
∆t
+ fα(tk, q, p, u) + E
[
v¯(tk, X¯tk,x(tk+1;u, h))
]}
.
(6.16)
Step 3.1 (approximating the expectation) The conditional expectation
E
[
v¯(tk, X¯tk,x,(tk+1))
]
in (6.2) is approximated by computing
vˆ(tk, x;u, h)
:=
1
M
M∑
m=1

1{Nam=0,Nbm=0}v¯0 (tk, X¯mtk,x(tk+1;u, h))+ ∑
i=a,b
1{Nim=0}v¯
i
(
tk, X¯
m
tk,x
(tk+1;u, h)
) .
Step 3.2 (value function and trading strategy when no arrival within the spread) This is
the case when there is no limit order arrival within the spread throughout the time interval
(tk−1, tk], meaning that N
i(tk) − N
i(tk−1) = 0, for i = a and b. The reward from using a
generic trading strategy u ∈ U (tk, p) and h ∈ {0, 1}
2 is
v¯0(tk, x;u, h) =
(
pa + pb
2
hbλb(pa − pb)−
pa + pb
2
haλa(pa − pb)
)
∆t
+ fα(tk, q, p, u) + vˆ(tk, x;u, h).
(6.17)
The optimal value from trading is
v¯0(tk, x) = max
{
v¯0(tk, x;u, h)|u ∈ U (tk, p) and h ∈ {0, 1}
2
}
. (6.18)
The optimal trading strategy is
(u¯0∗(tk, x), h¯
∗(tk, x)) =
{
u ∈ U (tk, p) and h ∈ {0, 1}
2
∣∣ such that v¯0(tk, x;u, h) = v¯0(tk, x)} .
(6.19)
Step 3.3 (value function and trading strategy when there is arrival within the spread)
This is the case when limit orders arrive within the spread at some point during the time
interval (tk−1, tk], meaning that N
i(tk) − N
i(tk−1) = 1, for i = a or b. The reward from
using a generic trading strategy u ∈ U (tk, p) is
v¯i(tk, x;u) = fα(tk, q, p, u) + v¯
0(tk, x;u) (6.20)
The optimal value from trading is
v¯i(tk, x) = max
{
v¯i(tk, x;u)|u ∈ U (tk, p)
}
. (6.21)
The optimal trading strategy is
u¯i∗(tk, x) =
{
u ∈ U (tk, p) | such that v¯
i(tk, x;u) = v¯
i(tk, x)
}
. (6.22)

We would like to distinguish between the computational complexities of the backward in-
duction algorithm on a CPU and on a GPU. The corollary below draws conclusion from
the discretization via the dynamic programming of the price switching problem, which is of
the type of combined impulse control and optimal control. Interested readers may verify if
the result is the same for other methods (PDE or backward SDE, if applicable) and other
control types.
27
Corollary 6.1 Let |T |, |X | and |U | respectively be the mesh sizes of the discretized time
grid, space grid and admissible control set, and M be the number of simulation paths to
estimate the conditional expectation. Using serial computation, the time complexity of the
algorithm is |T |× |X |× |U |×M . Using parallel computation to switch as much as possible
the complexity to space complexity, the space complexity of the algorithm is |X | × |U | ×M ,
and the time complexity can be reduced to at most |T | × |U | .
Proof. Table 6.1 lists the pseudo codes of the algorithm, the computational complexity at
every step and whether it is parallelizable or not. The computation at every node in the
state space X is always parallelizable, because it uses results from the previously computed
time step, and does not use any other nodes at the same time step. The number |U | is
the complexity to get the maximum expected reward among all admissible controls, hence
it cannot be carried out in parallel. For example, to get the maximum among the numbers
{a1, a2, · · · , aN}, one can inductively compute b1 := a1 and bn := max{bn−1, an}, for n =
2, · · · , N . Then bN = max{a1, a2, · · · , aN}. 
Remark 6.1 There are two important observations from Corollary 6.1.
(1) Because all the nodes in the state space at every time step can be computed in parallel,
stochastic control problems of mediumly high dimension is no longer numerically forbidding.
(2) The minimum time complexity on a GPU cluster is |T | × |U |, which is the number
of time steps multiplies the size of the admissible control set. The admissible set of mixed
strategies is the cube [0, p¯a]×
[
0, pb
]
, while the admissible set of price switching strategies is
only the integer points inside that cube, hence the price switching problem is much simpler
to implement.
6.3 Implementation
This subsection implements the algorithm in a simpler Binomial model, to the best capa-
bility of the author’s PC. An interesting application of the numerical results would be to
calculate a “fair” internalization premium ǫ∗.
From every time step tk to tk+1, the randomness in the model is captured by six Binomial
variables. Independence is assumed unless mentioned otherwise. Other features remaining
the same, the modifications from the previous subsection are the following.
(1) The change in the volume Qi caused by market participants other than the trader is
a random variable R(Qi) ∈ {−1, 1} with probabilities {0.5, 0.5}, i = a, b.
(2) Let the pair of random variables (R(Na), R(N b)) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)} indicate
whether limit sell and buy orders arrive (value one) or not (value zero) at one tick below the
ask price and one tick above the bid price, when the spread is greater than one tick. The three
scenarios are assigned probabilities {1−pN , pN/2, pN/2}, where pN = 0.3·min{spread−1, 1}.
(3) Let the pair of random variables (R(Ha), R(Hb)) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)} indicate
whether there is a liquidity event (value one) or not (value zero) that consumes the trader’s
hidden buy and sell orders at the mid price. The three scenarios are assigned probabilities
{0.5, 0.25, 0.25}.
(4) In addition, internalization here means only filling ∆a (∆b) shares at the time tk
price P a(tk) (P
b(tk)), when at time tk+1 limit sell (buy) orders arrive at a better price
P a(tk+1) = P
a(tk)− 1 (P
b(tk+1) = P
b(tk) + 1), indicated by R(N
a) = 1 (R(N b) = 1).
We use ∆a = ∆b = 5, pb = 12 and p¯a = 18. The time mesh is
{t0, t1, · · · , tK} = {1, 2, · · · , 10}.
At the terminal time tK = 10, the trader’s stock inventory is valued at P
b(10)− 2 per share
if it’s positive, and P a(10) + 2 per share if negative.
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Because the state space is infinite, it has to be truncated somehow on the boundary. The
largest grid that the author’s PC can accept is(
Qa, Qb, I, P a, P b
)
∈ X = {0, 1, · · · , 9, 10}2×{−20,−19, · · · , 19, 20}×{12, 13, · · · , 17, 18}2.
The grid contains 104181 admissible points where P a > P b.
How the trader’s optimal trading strategy interacts with simulated price paths is illus-
trated in Fig. 6.1 (regular trader), Fig. 6.2 (systemic internalizer) and Fig. 6.3 (systemic
internalizer). The initial time is t0 = 1 and terminal time T = 10. The initial values are
Qa(1) = Qb(1) = 5, P a(1) = 16, P b(1) = 15 and I(1) = 0. The trader’s activities in all three
figures display an attempt to sell short and push down the price. He indeed uses combina-
tions of different order types - active, hidden and internalizing orders. Due to the truncation
on the inventory, it is however not quite informative to compute the profit. More advanced
devices are needed to allow for a wider grid, especially a larger range of the inventory variable.
It is interesting to see the effect of internalization on the trader’s best expected profit.
The relative difference in best expected profits between a systemic internalizer and a regular
trader is defined as
V diff (t0; q
a, qb, z, pa, pb; ǫ)
:=
(
V int(t0; q
a, qb, z, pa, pb; ǫ)− V reg(t0; q
a, qb, z, pa, pb)
)
/V reg(t0; q
a, qb, z, pa, pb),
where V int(t0; ·; ǫ) and V
reg(t0; ·) are respectively the time-t0 value functions of systemic
internalizer and regular trader defined in (4.1), and ǫ is the internalization premium. Fig. 6.4
shows the distribution of V diff (t0; q
a, qb, z, pa, pb; ǫ = 0), with the initial values (qa, qb, z, pa, pb)
ranging over the 104181 admissible points on the grid. The systemic internalizer’s best
expected profit is 1%-15% higher than that of the regular trader on about 35% of the ad-
missible points. This means that internalization, when applied in the right situations, can
be on average profitable. Furthermore, it suggests a way to specify a “fair” value ǫ∗ of the
internalization premium, so that both parties of the transaction will gain.
Remark 6.2 Let a weight function w : X → (0, 1); (qa, qb, z, pa, pb) 7→ w(qa, qb, z, pa, pb)
represent the likelihood of each point in the state space, satisfying∑
(qa,qb,z,pa,pb)∈X
w(qa, qb, z, pa, pb) = 1.
For some commonly recognized reward criterion F in equation (3.2), some typical dura-
tion T of a trading period and some proper grid X of the state space, the “fair” internal-
ization premium ǫ∗ should be a strictly positive number such that the weighted average∑
(qa,qb,z,pa,pb)∈X
V diff (t0; q
a, qb, z, pa, pb; ǫ∗)w(qa, qb, z, pa, pb)
is somewhere above zero.
Since internalization is an additional choice that brings a higher best expected profit, ǫ∗
should be positive. Since internalization provides price improvements to his counterpart, ǫ∗
should be low enough to keep it profitable for a systemic internalizer to do so.
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Table
Table 6.1: The parallelizable algorithm in pseudo codes
Pseudo Codes Computational Complexity Parallelizable?
for (x in X )
{
for (u in U (T, p))
{
Step 1.1 |X | × |U | yes
} +
Step 1.2 |X | × |U | in x
print v¯(T, x) and u∗(T, x) to file
} +
for(k = K − 1, k −−, k ≥ 0) |T | no
{ ×
for (x in X ) ⌢
{
for (u in U (tk, p) and h in {0, 1}
2) |X | × |U | ×M yes
{
Step 2
Step 3.1 +
equation (6.2) in Step 3.2
}
equation (6.2) in Step 3.2 |X | × |U | in x
+
equation (6.2) in Step 3.2 |X | × |U | in x
print v¯0(tk, x), u
0∗(tk, x) and h
∗(tk, x) to file
}
for (x in X ) +
{
for (u in U (tk, p))
{
equation (6.2) in Step 3.3 |X | × |U | yes
} +
equation (6.2) in Step 3.3 |X | × |U | in x
+
equation (6.2) in Step 3.3 |X | × |U | in x
print v¯i(tk, x) and u
i∗(tk, x) to file ⌣
}
}
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Figures from Section 2
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Figure 2.1: A limit order book
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Figure 2.2: Simulation of the bid and ask prices
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Figure 2.3: Simulation of the volumes
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Figures from Section 6
Figure 6.1: Simulated path of prices, regular trader
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Figure 6.2: Simulated path of prices, systemic internalizer
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Figure 6.3: Another simulated path of prices, systemic internalizer
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Figure 6.4: Relative difference in best expected profits
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